Throughout some of Aristotle's most influential texts: Nicomachean Ethics (NE), De Anima (DA), and De Motu Animalium (MA), Aristotle develops his account of human action. Aristotle claims that all action is the result of the cooperation of desire and reason through practical syllogism. Over the last 2,000 years the problem of akrasia (acting against one’s own better judgment) has been used to argue against the soundness of Aristotle’s model. Socrates famously dismissed akrasia as impossible, as no agent does wrong with the understanding they are doing so (NE 1145b25-30). But I will argue that Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia is not a mere argument of ignorance but rather a nuanced argument that uses his account of practical knowledge becoming dormant. This argument is further strengthened with his explanation of habituation, determining the strength of the competing desires, explaining why some agents are more vulnerable to akrasia than others.
Akrasia presents a direct challenge to Aristotle's account of action. If we assume that an agent’s action is solely based on the cooperation of reason and desire through the practical syllogism, it then seems that when an action is determined to be bad, the agent should not perform it. But in reality when faced with a perfect piece of a rich chocolate cake at 2:00 AM even the strongest willed will sometimes fail to ignore their desire even with the present knowledge that it’s unhealthy and will result in worse sleep. This raises the question how can an agent both know the better course of action and fail to act on it?
Aristotle's account of action consists of two premises, the universal premise being what the agent wants or values and the particular premise being based on perception ie what is the agent currently being presented with, resulting in the conclusion being not a thought but an action in and of itself (MA 701a79-14). In Aristotle’s account reason and desire are co-movers meaning neither alone can produce action. Reason identifies the goal but has no motivational force, and desire provides the drive to act but has no target without reason. It is their combination that results in an intentional action being made, resulting in movement toward the perceived good (DA 433a14-19).
While this model makes intuitive sense the late night piece of cake seems to present a instance where the cooperation of reason and desire fails. The agent deduces that eating the cake to be bad, meaning they should not eat it, yet in the case of akrasia it seems to show desire acting as the sole operator for determining action, as the act of eating the cake goes completely against rational thought. This seems to create tension within Aristotle's theorem as how can desire lead an agent to act against what reason has already determined to be wrong?
Aristotle’s solution to this logical conundrum stems from his definition of ‘knowing’. He distinguishes the two types of engagement with knowledge, merely having it and actively using it. According to Aristotle the akratic person has the knowledge that the cake is unhealthy but isn’t using it. When the agent reaches for the cake in a daze at 2:00 AM they have two competing syllogisms operating simultaneously. The agent intuitively knows through their reasoning faculties that eating junk food at 2:00 AM is dumb (universal). But a competing syllogism driven by appetite is running simultaneously, sweet things are pleasant (universal), and this cake is sweet (particular). Aristotle argues that because desire’s particular premise is grounded in present perception, making it active. Where as, reason’s particular premise ‘this specific piece of cake is junk’ goes dormant because it refers not to anything the agent presently experiences but to a future consequence that is abstract and distant. Aristotle conveniently defines dormant knowledge as similar to a person who is presently drunk, the knowledge becomes inaccessible for guiding rational action (NE VII.3, 1147a10–14). While our 2:00 AM agent is capable of telling you that eating junk that late is unhealthy, but when left to his desires that knowledge has no real practical grip on their behavior as they cut into the cake with their dirty fork. As Aristotle said so eloquently “so much then for knowing and not knowing, and how it is possible to know and still to act incontinently". (NE VII.3, 1147b21-22)
Looking at what has been presented it seems that Aristotle’s argument has simply restated Socrates’ position that ‘nobody does wrong knowingly’, in more sophisticated terms. If the akratic agent is not truly exercising the relevant particular knowledge at the moment of action, then it seems that nobody truly does act against what they know as wrong. But using this analysis fails to appreciate Aristotle's reasoning for why knowledge becomes dormant. I believe that Aristotle's account of phantasia is the key that allows his account for desire and reasoning motivating action to work with even the most akratic agent.
Take a second a think back to the best piece of chocolate cake you’ve eaten (no seriously, DO IT). What did it feel like when you cut into it? What type of frosting did it have? How did it make you feel when you took your first bite? What you just experienced was not perception, there is (likely) no cake in front of you, but rather an appearance produced by what Aristotle calls phantasia, the faculty by which past sensory experience generates vivid appearances (DA III.3 428a1-4). In this little thought experiment the appearance was likely not just a neutral image of a cake, but rather an appearance that presents the cake as good and something worth pursuing, built on prior sensory experiences. This is exactly what is driving our agent at 2:00 AM to dive into the leftover chocolate cake.
Let us engage in one more thought experiment, take a moment to stare at the sun and ask yourself how big is the sun really? All the rational theory can never change the fact that the sun appears to you, if you are standing on Earth, as a mere foot in diameter (DA III.3 428b1-5). The same logic holds for our 2:00 AM agent no matter how many times the agent may close the fridge the appearance of a delicious cake will always be with them, even in the presence of the nagging knowledge that indulging would be gluttonous. The appearance of the cake is not rational knowledge but rather the product of a storied history between the agent and delicious chocolate cakes. It is this appearance which makes appetite's particular premise active, it’s not the rational notion that the cake is sweet but the appearance of the cake categorizing it as a good, fueling the desire of our agent to take just one more bite.
Furthermore, by determining the timelines that desire and rationality operate on the notion of rational thought going dormant is only further solidified. While our agent might have a desire to look good at the beach it’s their intellect fueled by reasoning that takes the desire and turns it into an actionable plan leading to the good in the future. In comparison the desire for the cake is grounded in the present meaning to our agent the cake appears not as an unhealthy treat, but simply as a good, full stop (DA III.10 433b6-10). The rationality that the cake will ruin our agent’s beach body has no practical grip as it is abstract, in the future, no sensory anchor on the present to compete with the immense desire fueled by the pleasant appearance of the cake. This asymmetry is not a failure of our agent’s intelligence but rather a byproduct of how desire and reason operate within the soul.
To finalize my argument for how Aristotle's argument accounts for akrasia, I would like to point to Aristotle's explanation for how virtuous agents are formed in order to determine what makes some agents more vulnerable to akratic behavior than others. According to Aristotle the nature of our agent permits for the formation of virtues and that character virtues stem from habit (NE II. 1 1103a16-27). Meaning depending on how different agents grew up determines whether or not they are driven by reason or desire when the open the fridge. Each time our agent gives into their appetite, their potential for desire grows stronger further fueling the phantasia and making their ability to reason about healthy choices weaker for the next time they open the fridge. Conversely if our agent was habituated to take pleasure in eating healthy the desire for junk food would be insignificant to the desire for a nutritious option, motivating the agent to reach past the cake and grab a cup of yogurt. Habituation therefore explains not just how akrasia occurs, but why it afflicts some agents more than others. This provides an explanation for how our agent developed such a strong desire for the 2:00 AM chocolate cake.
Given all the premises previously stated the notion that Aristotle’s theory of action breaks down in the face of akrasia fails to fully appreciate the strength habituation and phantasia has on shaping the desires of a moral agent. The akratic person is not a counter example but rather evidence that the argument holds even at extreme levels of desire. When our agent opens the fridge at 2:00 AM, desire and reason are still cooperating just not at the optimal level to make the most rational decision. Aristotle’s concept of phantasia, drawing on a lifetime of pleasant experiences, generates an appearance of goodness that activates the appetite's particular premise while reason’s particular premise goes dormant. The immediacy of the desire leaves rationality's future oriented knowledge without the practical grip that determines what actions are taken in the present. The agent does not lack the knowledge associated with reason, but the conditions under which that knowledge influences the agent are miniscule within a sea of chocolatey goodness that blinds our agent with desire.